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Middle East Respiratory Syndrome
AGlobal Health Challenge
InMay 2013,World Health Organization (WHO) Direc-
tor-GeneralMargaretChanwarned that anovel corona-
virus, Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus
(MERS-CoV), posed “a threat to the entire world.”1 Her
warning was prescient. As of June 12, 2015, WHO had
been notified of 1289 individuals with laboratory-
confirmed infections in 25 countries, of whom at least
455 individuals (37%)haddied.2Morethan85%ofcases
have been diagnosed in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
Unlike the distantly related, more contagious, but
less fatal severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavi-
rus (SARS-CoV),MERS-CoVhadnotbeenpublicly linked
toa “super-spreading” event (1 patient linked to10 in-
fections) untilMay2015 in theRepublic of Korea.When
the index case, a man aged 68 years from the Republic
of Korea, returned to Incheon International Airport (lo-
cated 30mileswest of Seoul) onMay 4, hewas asymp-
tomatic. He reportedly had traveled to Bahrain, United
ArabEmirates, theKingdomof Saudi Arabia, andQatar,
but initially declared travel only to outbreak-free Bah-
rain.HebecamesymptomaticonMay 11 andsoughtcare
in 2 outpatient clinics and 2 hospitals. He was eventu-
allyadmittedtoPyeongtaekStMary’shospital,Gyeonggi
province,butMERS-CoVwasunconfirmeduntilMay20,
reportedly initiating chains of transmission that in-
creased to involve 126caseswith 11deathsasof June 10.
The index patient was still hospitalized as of June 12.
ChinareportedaMERS-CoVcaseonMay29,2015—a
managed44yearsfromtheRepublicofKoreawhoflewto
HongKongonMay26,subsequentlytravelingtoHuizhou,
Guangdongprovince,wherehewasplacedinisolation.Ge-
netic sequencing showednoMERS-CoVmutations.
Origins, Epidemiology, and Clinical Features
MERS is a viral respiratory illness novel to humans. First
reported inJeddah, theKingdomofSaudiArabia, inJune
2012, theearliest outbreakoccurred inMarchorApril of
2012 in Zarqa, Jordan, with 9 laboratory-confirmed
cases.Theoutbreakwas retrospectively linkedtoMERS-
CoV using frozen specimens.3,4
MERS is a zoonotic disease, with dromedary cam-
els the likely animal reservoir. Transmission risk factors
include respiratoryexposure to camel secretions, drink-
ing raw camelmilk, or eating undercooked camelmeat.
Studies report increased risk in individuals with occu-
pational contact with camels.5
MERS-CoVistransmissibleperson-to-person,butsus-
tained community transmission has not been observed.
LikeSARS-CoV,healthcaresettingspose thehighest risk.
YetMERS-CoV is less contagious thanSARS-CoVandhas
higher fatality rates. Hospital-related outbreaks have oc-
curred inmultiplecountries, includingsubstantialnosoco-
mial transmissions across theKingdomof SaudiArabia.
MERS typically presents as a nonspecific febrile re-
spiratory tract infection, but can progress rapidly to re-
spiratory failure, or it may never become severe. Thus
far, children have rarely contracted or died fromMERS-
CoV.Risk factors fordiseaseprogression includecomor-
bidity with lung disease, kidney disease, diabetes, and
immunodeficiency.
AGlobal Health Emergency?
TheWHOdirector-general has convened 8 Emergency
Committeemeetings onMERS under the International
HealthRegulations, declining todeclare aPublicHealth
Emergencyof InternationalConcern (PHEIC).Given the
ongoing outbreak, the director-general convened the
ninthmeeting on June 16, with 2major events inmind:
the month of Ramadan, which begins June 17 with a
surge in travelersandpilgrimsperforming theUmrahpil-
grimage in theKingdomofSaudiArabia, and theHajj pil-
grimage, the largest gathering in the world, which oc-
curs September 20 through 25.
WHO was sharply criticized for delays in declaring
Ebola a PHEIC, but that should not provoke an overre-
action to MERS-CoV. WHO should amend the Interna-
tional Health Regulations to grant the director-general
flexibility to designate graduated alert levels, from
heightened vigilance, rising to a PHEIC onlywhen justi-
fied. On June 13, WHO and the Republic of Korea pre-
sented the results of a joint mission to understand the
virus and its transmission patterns.
Public Health Strategies
Public healthmeasures—infection prevention and con-
trol, isolation, contact tracing, and quarantine—
historically have controlled MERS-CoV and were also
widely employed during SARS and Ebola outbreaks.
Transparency and Trust
Public fear andmistrust in government can impedeepi-
demic response.TheMERS-CoVoutbreak in theRepub-
lic ofKoreaoccurred in the aftermathof theSewol ferry
disaster inApril2014,whichresulted inthedeathsof304
students. Thegovernmentof theRepublic ofKoreawas
criticized for what some perceived to be an uncoordi-
natedresponseandgovernmentobfuscation. In thecase
of MERS-CoV, health authorities initially withheld the
namesof hospitals handling cases. Transparencybuilds
public trust;given inevitablescientificuncertainty,health
authorities should fullydisclosewhat is and isnotknown
about theMERS-CoV outbreak.
Community and Health Care Settings
MERS-CoV, likeothercoronaviruses, spreads throughre-
spiratory tract secretions, with hand hygiene recom-
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mended. TheRepublic of Korea has seen a surge in hand sanitizers,
as well as face masks.6 WHO recommends health worker precau-
tions (eg, contact anddroplet protective equipment), aswell as air-
borneprecautions foraerosol-generatingprocedures.Crowdedhos-
pitals and comingling of health workers, patients, and family
members likely contribute to transmission in health care settings.7
Early identification can prevent transmission and requires careful
travel histories for differential diagnosis. Healthworker training on
infectionpreventionandcontrol, aswell asdiagnostic testingof cer-
tain travelers, remains critical for an effective response.
Isolation andQuarantine
Isolation of patients with a known infection is recommended, but
optimal implementation of quarantine for exposed individuals is
more controversial (home-based, medical facility, or special hous-
ing). For example, the cordon sanitaire (a guarded line preventing
residents from leaving) to control Ebola provokedviolence inMon-
rovia, Liberia. During the SARS outbreak of 2003, China and Singa-
pore employedmass quarantines in apartment complexes or other
structures, monitored by armed guards or ankle bracelets. The Re-
public of Korea placed more than 3000 individuals exposed to
MERS-CoV in quarantine, mostly at home, but some in state-
designated facilities. Authoritieswere tracking cell phone signals to
monitorpatientcompliance.Togainpublic trust,quarantinesshould
be limited to well-documented exposures using the least restric-
tive means possible.
Travel Restrictions
The Republic of Korea restricted the travel of quarantined MERS-
CoVcontacts followinga securitybreachallowingaquarantinedpa-
tient to fly toHongKong. The traveler deniedMERS-CoVexposure,
even though he was febrile on arrival. He was then allowed to pro-
ceed by bus to Guangdong province where he tested positive for
MERS-CoV. Hong Kong issued a “red alert” advising against unnec-
essary travel to the Republic of Korea—a decision likely to be fol-
lowed by other countries. This contravenesWHO guidance, which
finds travel restrictions ineffective due to lack of community trans-
mission.
School Closures
Morethan2400kindergartens, schools,anduniversitieswereclosed
in theRepublic of Korea, despiteMinistry ofHealth guidance that it
was “medicallywrong,” toodrastic aprecautiongivendisruptions in
child education.6WHOhasurged the reopeningof schools, and the
Republic of Korea has begun doing so. School closures may have a
rolewithnovel influenzas,butareunproven forMERS-CoVgiventhe
lack of community transmission.
WhoOwnsMERS-CoV?
In June 2012, amicrobiologist in Jeddah sent blood samples froma
patientwithunexplainedpneumonia toErasmusMedicalCenter, the
Netherlands, which identified a novel coronavirus later confirmed
as MERS-CoV. Erasmus then shared samples with multiple labora-
tories under material transfer agreements, contracts for transfer-
ring pathogens. Erasmus filed for patents on the use of the MERS-
CoV gene sequence. The Kingdomof Saudi Arabia warned that the
microbiologist violated national rules and that Erasmus acted
unethically.8
Following Indonesia’s refusal to share influenzaA(H5N1),WHO
adopted the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Framework in May
2011,governingvirussharing.This framework,however, fails tocover
noninfluenza pathogens. Impediments to virus sharing, restrictive
material transfer agreements, and patents can impede research on
novelpathogens. InMay2013,DrChanstated, “No[intellectualprop-
erty] should stand in the way of you, the countries of the world, to
protect your people.”8 Yet there remain substantial holes in inter-
national rules needed to facilitate critical research.
Strengthening Health Systems
Acritical lesson fromSARS, Ebola, andnowMERS is that health set-
tingscanamplify transmission risks.Historically,healthsettingshave
exposed patients and visitors due to close contact that facilitates
spread of respiratory tract secretions and infected body fluids, as
well as healthworkerswhohavenot employedpersonal protective
equipment.However, awell-trainedandwell-preparedhealthwork-
force—bothhealth care andpublic health—usually can rapidly bring
outbreaks under control. The International Health Regulations re-
quire all states to build core capacities, including diagnosis, treat-
ment, laboratories, contact tracing, isolation, andhumane formsof
quarantine. Fully funding and implementing that international ob-
ligation offers the best assurance of global health security. The on-
going outbreak in the Republic of Korea is an important reminder
thatMERSrequiresconstantvigilanceandcanbebroughtundercon-
trol with effective public health strategies.
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